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1. Relativism and incommensurability
Relativism emerged as a significant issue in the philosophy of science as a result of the historical
turn that took place in the field in the 1960s.  Influenced by historical studies of science,
philosophers came to see the process of scientific theory change as crucial to the understanding of
science itself.  Rather than focus on static relations between theory and evidence, proponents of the
historical turn emphasized the profound transformations which accompany theory change.  The
transformations are not restricted to mere change in what theories say about the world.  They extend
to the method and practice of science, alter the conceptual and semantic apparatus of theories, and
affect the content of scientists’ perceptual experience.  But in the absence of fixed elements capable
of playing a neutral role in the context of theory change, it is unclear how choice between competing
theories may be made on an objective basis.  Because of this a relativistic account of scientific
theory choice may seem to be the inevitable consequence of the historical turn in the philosophy of
science.
Among the most influential advocates of the historical approach to the philosophy of science
were Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn, both of whom emphasized the far-reaching implications
of scientific theory change.  In separate publications originally published in 1962, Feyerabend and
Kuhn independently proposed the thesis that successive or competing theories may be
2incommensurable with each other.  But while they used the same word to describe the relationship
between theories, they did not mean precisely the same thing by it.   In ‘Explanation, Reduction and
Empiricism’, Feyerabend characterized the absence of logical relations which he took to follow from
meaning variance between theories as a relation of incommensurability (Feyerabend 1981, ch. 4).
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn argued that revolutionary transition between the
theoretical structures that he called ‘paradigms’ leads to variation of method, conceptual apparatus
and perceptual experience which renders such paradigms incommensurable.  In later work, Kuhn
restricted the claim of incommensurability to a semantic relation of untranslatability between the
specialized vocabularies used by theories.  The thesis that alternative scientific theories or paradigms
may be incommensurable with each other provides a basis for a number of different forms of
relativism in the philosophy of science.
There are at least three distinct ways in which relativism may derive support from the thesis
of incommensurability.  The first relates to the choice between theories.  If incommensurable
theories are expressed by means of semantically variant vocabulary, then it may not be possible for
the claims of one theory to enter into conflict with the claims of a theory with which it is
incommensurable.  In such a situation, it may be impossible to conduct a crucial test to empirically
decide between conflicting predictions made by the alternative theories.  If, in addition to this, the
standards of theory appraisal are not fixed and neutral, but instead vary with theory, the proponents
of alternative theories may appeal to different sets of standards to justify their acceptance of
opposing theories.  But if each side appeals to their own standards, and there are no shared
standards, the result is a stand-off.  Under such circumstances, there would appear to be no objective
basis for the choice between theories.  Such an outcome lends support to the position of epistemic
3relativism which denies the existence of universal or objective standards which may serve as neutral
arbiter in the choice between alternative theories or belief-systems.
The second route to relativism turns on the relation between semantic variance and truth.
Semantic variance gives rise to a form of relativism about truth.  Semantic variance may result in
failure to translate from the vocabulary of one theory into the vocabulary of another.  But if
translation fails between theories, then a true claim that is asserted by one theory may be unable to
be expressed in the context of another theory.  Such inability to express true claims of one theory
in the vocabulary of another provides a sense in which truth is relative to theory.  It makes truth
relative in the sense that a truth that may be formulated in the vocabulary of one theory may not even
be expressible in the vocabulary of another.  The ability to assert a particular truth becomes relative
to theory.  Such relativism differs from what is ordinarily meant by relativism about truth.  For truth
does not vary with theory in the sense that a claim that is true in one theory is false in another.
Rather, truth is relative to theory in the weaker sense that a truth of one theory is not expressible
within the other.  While such a weak relativism about truth may fall short of the claim that truth
varies with theory, it avoids the classic objection that relativism about truth is incoherent.  For it
does not claim that one and the same proposition is true in the context of one theory and false in
another.
The third form of relativism is more extreme than either of the previous two.  There is a hint
of it in occasional remarks by Kuhn which emphasize the profound effects of scientific revolution,
e.g., “when paradigms change, the world itself changes with them” (1996, p. 111) or  “the
proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds” (1996, p. 150). Such
remarks may have been intended in a figurative sense.  But they are open to anti-realist
4interpretation.  On such an interpretation, the world investigated by science depends upon the
currently accepted paradigm.  The entities to which scientists refer vary with paradigm.
Incommensurable paradigms are situated in their own “worlds”.  Such talk of worlds which vary
with paradigm reflects a position of ontological relativism, according to which the world is relative
to paradigm.  There is an element of idealism in such a position because it makes the world depend
in some manner on human thought.  It may also serve as a further basis for relativism about truth,
since the states of affairs that make statements true may vary from the world of one paradigm to
another.  (For an influential interpretation which presents Kuhn’s position as a neo-Kantian position,
see Hoyningen-Huene Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions.)
As this overview reveals, the notion of incommensurability is not a simple notion with an
agreed or stable meaning.  The notion is borrowed from mathematics where it has a standard
meaning in the context of measurement.  In its original setting, to say that two magnitudes are
incommensurable is to say that there is no common unit of measurement which may be employed
in whole units to measure both magnitudes.  But, while use of the notion in the philosophy of
science derives from the mathematical usage, it is an extension of the notion that is not determined
in advance by its use in its original setting.  Apart from the fact that its use in the philosophy of
science imports concepts of a semantic and epistemological nature, there is also the question of how
to interpret the idea of a unit of measurement in the context of theory choice.  Perhaps the units of
measurement are to be understood as individual units of signification such as words or sentences
which fail to be shared by conceptually disparate theories.  Or perhaps the units are alternative
standards of theory appraisal adopted by the proponents of incommensurable  theories.
5The usual reading of the notion of incommensurability in the philosophy of science interprets
the notion in terms of the comparison of theories.  In the absence of a common unit of measurement,
there is no common unit by means of which incommensurable theories may be compared.  But while
at a general level this may be an appropriate interpretation of the notion in this context, it is
important not to adhere too closely to this interpretation.  It is always possible to compare theories
in some manner.  The question is how they may be compared.  The point of the thesis of
incommensurability is that there may be significant limits on the extent to which theories may be
compared for the purposes of  theory appraisal and choice.  Indeed, it may prove impossible to
compare theories with respect to issues of relevance to theory appraisal and choice, though they
might otherwise be comparable in ways not relevant to such choice.
Given the lack of a well-defined meaning for the term, progress on the topic of
incommensurability has been fragmentary.  Rather than a focused discussion using a set of common
terms with agreed meanings, there have been diverse approaches to various aspects of the topic with
little overall coherence.  To impose a semblance of order on the topic, I employ a distinction
between two broad forms of incommensurability.  On the one hand, semantic incommensurability
is incommensurability due to semantic variance of the vocabulary employed by theories.  On the
other hand, methodological incommensurability is incommensurability due to variation in
methodological standards between theories.
The discussion that follows will be divided into two main parts.  The first relates to semantic
incommensurability, the second to methodological incommensurability.  I regard semantic
incommensurability as the primary form of incommensurability.  Hence, more space will be devoted
to semantic than to methodological incommensurability.  The latter raises a number of issues in the
6epistemology and methodology of science that tend not to be treated under the rubric of
incommensurability.  Hence, I will say less about this aspect of the topic.  Once I have discussed the
issues separately, I will offer some thoughts on the future prospects for the incommensurability
thesis.
The distinction between semantic and methodological forms of incommensurability may not
be acceptable to all parties to the discussion.  Some may object on the grounds that the two forms
of incommensurability are conceptually entwined in a way that undermines the distinction.  It might,
for example, be argued in verificationist vein that methodological standards are tied to the use
conditions of scientific terms, so that variation of the one affects the other.  Alternatively, one might
object on the grounds that, though conceptually distinct, in practice the two forms of
incommensurability always occur together in actual science.  For it might be held that the effect of
revolutionary change is such that it invariably extends to both conceptual and methodological
aspects of science.
However, as will become apparent in what follows, the distinction between the two forms
of incommensurability reflects a genuine difference between two distinct sets of philosophical
concerns.  The arguments relating to semantic incommensurability turn on considerations in the
philosophy of language about meaning and reference, as well as translation failure between the
vocabulary of theories.  By contrast, the arguments relating to methodological incommensurability
draw on epistemological considerations about standards of theory appraisal as well as the nature of
the epistemic warrant of such standards.  While it might be held that the two forms of
incommensurability only ever occur together in actual theory change, it remains clear that distinct
sets of philosophical considerations apply to the separate forms of incommensurability.
72. Semantic incommensurability
The thesis that theories may be incommensurable for semantic reasons stems from reflection on the
language employed to express scientific theories.  Feyerabend and Kuhn both rejected the empiricist
idea of an independently meaningful observation language.  They held instead that the meaning of
observational terms is at least in part theory-dependent.  In addition, both authors adopted some form
of semantic holism.  They understood the meaning of both observational and theoretical vocabulary
to depend significantly upon the theoretical context in which the vocabulary is employed.  Because
of the context-dependence of meaning, a semantic shift takes place in the transition between theories
that affects some or all of the vocabulary associated with the theories involved.
Feyerabend first explicitly mentioned incommensurability in the course of a discussion of
the empiricist account of inter-theory relations.  Logical empiricists held that successive theories
enter into relations of explanation and reduction.  They sought to analyze explanation and reduction
as deductive relationships whereby the laws of earlier theories are logical consequences of the laws
of the theories that replace them.  Feyerabend pointed out that the deductive relationship required
by such an approach assumes a condition of meaning invariance between the vocabulary of the
successive theories.  Otherwise the laws of the displaced theory would not be derivable from the
laws of the later theory that subsumes them.  Against the empiricist approach, Feyerabend argued
that the condition of meaning invariance is violated in actual science because of conceptual change
which occurs in the process of theory-change.  In addition, he argued that some of the central
concepts of earlier theories are unable to be defined within the context of the theories that replace
them.  As a result of semantic variation between theories the deductive consequences of such
8successive theories form disjoint classes, so that the logical relationships required for deductive
subsumption fail to obtain.  Feyerabend introduced the term ‘incommensurable’ in order to describe
the lack of intersection of logical content due to the variation of meaning between theories.
As previously indicated, Kuhn originally employed the notion of incommensurability in a
more expansive vein than Feyerabend, though he later restricted its scope to semantic elements.  In
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn argued that science is characterized by occasional
periods of revolution, in the course of which a dominant paradigm is replaced by an
incommensurable alternative paradigm.  Like Feyerabend, Kuhn took conceptual change to
undermine the reductionist model of theory succession.  He placed particular emphasis on change
in the categories employed by theories in classifying the items in their domain of application.  In
Kuhn’s view, change of classificatory apparatus is a key feature of revolutionary change in science.
Such change affects what Kuhn calls the “similarity relations” which are believed to hold between
objects.  After a revolution, objects formerly grouped together are assigned to different classes.
Conversely, objects previously allocated to different groups are classified together afterwards.  Such
changes in classification result in a semantic shift which affects the terms that refer to the
reclassified entities.  The semantic shift may involve change in both the sense and the reference of
the terms.  In light of the resulting semantic variation between theories, Kuhn claimed that there is
no common language into which the claims of such theories may be translated in an exact manner.
Especially in later work, Kuhn understood such incommensurability as a localized phenomenon.
It is a semantic relation of untranslatability that holds between interdefined subsets of terms within
the special vocabularies employed by theories.  Because the translation failure is localized, Kuhn
9allowed that there may be an overlap of shared semantically stable vocabulary between
incommensurable theories.
The localized character of Kuhn’s version of the incommensurability thesis permits an
important distinction to be drawn between two versions of the semantic form of the
incommensurability thesis.  Where Kuhn held that translation failure is confined to a narrow set of
terms within the vocabulary of incommensurable theories, Feyerabend instead argued that the
observation language employed by a theory depends upon the theory for its semantic interpretation.
As a result, the meaning of the observation language varies between theories.  This tends to suggest
that for Feyerabend it is the entirety of the vocabulary utilized by theories, both observational and
theoretical, that is subject to semantic variation.  In light of this apparent difference between their
views, we may distinguish between partial meaning variance, where there is semantic variation
between some of the terms used by theories, and radical meaning variance, where there is semantic
variation between all of the vocabulary used by theories.  This in turn permits a distinction between
a restricted Kuhnian version of the incommensurability thesis and a more extreme Feyerabendian
version of the doctrine.
For both Kuhn and Feyerabend, semantic incommensurability involves variation of meaning
between the language used to express theories.  Commentators have tended to focus on one crucial
apparent implication of meaning variance with respect to the comparison of the content of theories.
Namely, if theories are unable to be stated in a common, semantically stable vocabulary, then the
content of such theories is unable to be compared.  For what one theory says about the world neither
asserts nor denies the same thing as what the other theory says about the world.  In the absence of
shared meaning, theories fail to engage with one another.  They neither agree nor disagree with
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respect to any substantive claim that either makes about the world.  Given this, many commentators
take incommensurability to imply the incomparability of the content of theories.  Of course, where
semantic variance between theories is less than complete, the comparability of content is restricted
to assertions which may be expressed using vocabulary that is shared between theories.
In light of the incomparability of content, the incommensurability thesis is open to an
important objection that is sometimes known as the rivalry objection.  To make the point vivid, I
will state the objection in terms of radical rather than partial meaning variance.  The objection arises
because incommensurable theories are supposed to enter into a relation of rivalry.  After all,
incommensurable theories are competing or alternative theories between which scientists are meant
to make a choice in the context of scientific theory change or revolution.  But if incommensurable
theories neither agree nor disagree with respect to any claim about the world, then they are unable
to enter into a relation of rivalry.  For if there is no point on which such theories may enter into
conflict, then they do not compete with respect to the purported truth or falsity of any particular
claim about the world.  There is no claim with respect to which the theories are rivals.  Given the
lack of rivalry, it is entirely unclear why there is a need to choose between incommensurable
theories in the first place.  Indeed, given that incommensurable theories fail to agree on any
particular point, one wonders how they may even be about the same things, much less enter into a
relation of rivalry with respect to the same things.  As will emerge in what follows, the rivalry
objection poses less of a threat to the localized version of semantic incommensurability that involves
only partial meaning variance.
In reply to the rivalry objection, proponents of incommensurability may insist that the
relation of incommensurability is one of deep rivalry that goes beyond relations between specific
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assertions.  Semantic variance prevents theories from entering into ordinary relations of conflict or
agreement.  But incommensurable theories are incompatible at the level of basic ontology.  The way
the world is according to one theory is completely at odds with the way it is according to the other.
The central principles of one theory may not be upheld unless the central principles of the other are
rejected.  The categories of one theory may not be employed unless the categories of the other are
eliminated.  But while defenders of incommensurability suppose that such a relation of deep rivalry
may obtain between theories, it remains unclear how the point is to be reconciled with semantic
variance between theories.  For it is natural to suppose that the relevant relationship of
incompatibility must manifest itself in a disagreement between sentences which state the basic
principles of the theories or which describe their categorical structures.  But it is difficult to see how
such relations may obtain without some elements of common meaning shared between the theories.
The rivalry objection raises issues about the relations between theories that have never been
satisfactorily resolved by advocates of the incommensurability thesis.  However, the outlines of a
resolution will emerge as we consider the two main approaches that have been proposed in response
to the incommensurability thesis.  The first approach, which I call the translational response,
challenges the coherence of the idea of an untranslatable language to which the incommensurability
gives rise.  As we shall see, the response to this approach in terms of restricted translation failure
against the background of a common language enables some sense to be made of a rivalry between
incommensurable theories.  The second approach, which I call the referential response, holds that
there are relations of referential overlap between semantically variant theories on the basis of which
the content of such theories may be compared.  Relations of referential overlap provide a further
basis on which a relation of rivalry may obtain between theories, since assertions which contain co-
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referring terms are able to enter into relations of agreement and disagreement with respect to shared
referents.
2.1 The translational response
The primary source for the translational response is an influential paper by Donald Davidson, ‘On
the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’ (1984).  Davidson sought to challenge the intelligibility of
the idea of a conceptual scheme by attacking the dualism of content and scheme on which it rests.
As part of this task, Davidson argued that no coherent sense may be made of the idea of an
untranslatable language.  Given the connection between incommensurability and untranslatability,
Davidson’s attack on the scheme-content dualism serves as a forceful critique of the idea of
incommensurability.  However, as we shall see, it is possible to respond to Davidson in  a way that
leads to a more defensible formulation of the incommensurability thesis.
Davidson develops a number of different lines of objection to the notion of an untranslatable
language.  He notes the paradoxical nature of any argument for translation failure which proceeds
by expressing the content of a purportedly untranslatable term in the very language into which it is
unable to be translated.  He also points to the problematic character of evidence for untranslatability:
failure to translate provides no more support for the claim that a language is untranslatable than it
does for the claim that it is not a language in the first place.  However, he does not take translation
as criterial for language.  That function is served by truth.  The criterion for an alternative conceptual
scheme, and for the intertranslatable languages that embody it, is fit with experience or reality.
Davidson argues that this amounts to the view that a conceptual scheme is an alternative scheme if
what is said in it is “largely true but not translatable” (1984, p. 194).  Against this, he objects that
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we do not understand the notion of truth at all if it is divorced from translation.  The extension of
the truth-predicate is fixed for English and languages translatable into English.  Hence, we have no
grip on the notion of truth in application to languages not translatable into our own.  Davidson also
draws on his well-known principle of interpretative charity to argue that in order to understand
others we must attribute a large measure of truth to their utterances.  Charity militates against failure
of translation because charitable attribution of truth requires translation.
The primary thrust of Davidson’s critique of the scheme-content dualism is directed against
the idea that there may be complete translation failure between alternative conceptual schemes.  This
enables an important clarification to be made in relation to incommensurability.  Namely, it is a
mistake to understand the incommensurability thesis as a thesis about radically alternative or total
conceptual schemes.  It is a restricted thesis about the relationship between the vocabulary of
semantically variant theories.  The claim that translation may fail between theories is therefore a
claim that there may be translation failure within a language.  Such translation failure obtains within
the context of an embracing natural language which contains the vocabulary of both theories.  Of
course, the extent of the translation failure involved depends on whether Kuhn’s localized or
Feyerabend’s more extreme version of the thesis is at issue.  But, in either case, incommensurability
involves a relation of translation failure between delimited areas within a background natural
language.
The point that incommensurability involves translation failure within a language removes
some of the problematic consequences highlighted by Davidson.  As I have argued in an earlier
paper, ‘In Defence of Untranslatability’ (1990), it is possible to employ the background natural
language as a metalanguage within which it may be shown that terms from one theory are unable
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to be translated into the specialized vocabulary of an alternative theory.  Moreover, the evidential
problem of showing that an untranslatable language is indeed linguistic does not arise in the case
of such circumscribed failure of translation.  Given that the vocabulary is embedded in an embracing
natural language, as well as within the broader linguistic practices of the scientists who employ the
vocabulary, no question arises of whether the vocabulary is linguistic in nature.  It is important,  in
addition, to note that the limited nature of the translation failure provides a basis on which to reduce
the threat of the rivalry objection.  For it may be possible to employ the linguistic resources of the
background natural language, as well as any scientific vocabulary that is shared across theories, to
specify a common domain of application for incommensurable theories, as well as to identify areas
of conflict to the extent that vocabulary is shared.
A further point of relevance to Davidson’s critique derives from a distinction that may be
found in the writings of both Kuhn and Feyerabend.  Both authors employ a distinction between
understanding (or interpreting) what is said in a language and translating what is said in one
language into another.  Both deny that translation is required for new language acquisition.  The
ability to translate into a language depends on the semantic resources of the language.  By contrast,
understanding is a relation between a language user and a language, which involves no relation
between languages.  On the basis of this distinction, Kuhn and Feyerabend argue that a speaker may
come to understand what is said in a newly encountered language whether or not it is translatable
into the speaker’s native language.  The distinction between translation and understanding is
supported by reflection upon first language acquisition as well as the immersion technique in
foreign-language teaching.  The plausibility of the claim that one may understand the vocabulary
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of an incommensurable theory is increased if it is borne in mind that the acquisition of such
vocabulary may take place within the context of a shared natural language.
Given the possibility of direct language-acquisition, it is possible to dispel Davidson’s
concern that interpretative charity requires translation.  For if it is possible to acquire a language
without translation, understanding does not require translation of sentences of a foreign language
into true sentences of the home language.  At the same time, ability to understand what is said using
the vocabulary of an incommensurable theory provides a further basis on which to address the
rivalry objection.  For without translating between the semantically variant vocabularies, a speaker
who understands both will recognize that they are employed to speak about a common domain of
entities and phenomena.  As we shall see in the next section, however, a more substantive basis for
rivalry requires that it be possible to identify specific overlaps of reference between the terms of
semantically variant theories.
2.2 The referential response
As we have just seen, it is possible to deal with the translational response in a way that yields a more
plausible version of the incommensurability thesis.  But no account of incommensurability that fails
to address the issue of reference can be complete.  Reference plays a crucial role in agreement and
disagreement.  It is what enables theories to enter relations of agreement and disagreement.  It is
therefore of essential relevance to the comparability of the content of theories.
In his 1967 book, Science and Subjectivity, Israel Scheffler draws upon the Fregean
distinction between sense and reference in his analysis of the problem of meaning variance.
Scheffler pointed out that terms may refer to the same thing even though they differ in sense.
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Sameness of reference is all that is needed for the comparison of content.  Sentences whose
constituent terms refer to the same things are able to enter into relations of agreement and
disagreement with respect to the those same things.  On the basis of the sense-reference distinction,
it may therefore be denied that the incomparability of content follows from meaning variance.
Provided that the terms used by theories co-refer, their content may be compared, even if the sense
of the terms varies between theories.
Scheffler’s point need not be restricted to relations of strict identity of reference.  There is
a variety of relations of referential overlap which Michael Devitt describes as ‘quasi-logical
relations’ (Devitt 1991, p. 170).  These relations include extensional inclusion and intersection,
partial reference and the co-reference of term-tokens.  Such quasi-logical relations serve as a basis
on which the content of theories may be compared, since theories may agree or disagree with respect
to items that fall within the area of referential overlap.  Provided that theories are applied to the same
domain, relations of referential overlap obtain which suffice for the comparison of content.  Nor is
the point restricted to cases in which theories succeed in referring to entities that actually exist.
There may be cases in which a theoretical term fails to refer (e.g. ‘phlogiston’).  But competing
theories may still be compared by means of such terms.  All that is needed is that the terms would
refer to the same thing in both theories, if they refer to anything at all.  Given sameness of intended
reference, the term may be employed as a basis on which to compare the theories.
The point that shared reference suffices for the comparability of content is not a matter of
controversy.  It is doubtful, however, whether the semantic variation of relevance to
incommensurability is limited to variation in the sense of terms used by theories.  Both Kuhn and
Feyerabend took change of meaning between theories to include variation of reference as well as
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sense (e.g. Kuhn 1996, p. 102; Feyerabend 1981, p. 98).  Indeed, both Kuhn and Feyerabend seemed
to hold that theory change involves wholesale discontinuity of reference, though Kuhn later
restricted reference change to shifts of membership between the central “taxonomic categories”
employed by theories (2000, p. 30).  But if reference is not preserved between theories, then it
cannot be assumed that the content of theories may be compared on the basis of common reference.
The possibility that reference may vary as a result of theory change raises the question of
how reference is determined.  For the manner in which reference is affected by theory change
depends on whether factors which determine reference are altered in theory change.  According to
the traditional Fregean description theory of reference, reference is determined by a description
which expresses the sense of a term.  Items which satisfy the description belong to the extension of
the term.  Although Feyerabend and Kuhn do not explicitly endorse a description theory of
reference, they tend to assume that description plays an important role in determining reference.  As
I have sought to show in The Incommensurability Thesis (1994), their treatment of reference often
assumes that description is the principal determinant of reference.  But if reference is determined
by description, then change of reference will be a routine consequence of theory change.  For as
theories are modified and replaced, the descriptions they give of the objects in their domain are
likewise modified and replaced. Where later descriptions are incompatible with earlier descriptions,
or a whole new set of entities is described, theory change gives rise to reference change.
Since the work of Saul Kripke, however, the description theory of reference has been
considered problematic.  On the one hand, a term may be successfully used to refer even though it
is associated with an incorrect description of its referent.  On the other hand, a term may fail to refer
to items despite the fact that they satisfy the description associated with the term.  Thus, to at least
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some extent, reference is independent of description.  As opposed to the description theory of
reference, advocates of the causal theory of reference have argued that language users enter into
pragmatic relations with their environment which play an important role in the determination of
reference.  Causal theorists emphasize the role played by ostensive definition in naming ceremonies
at which natural kind terms are introduced in the presence of samples of the kind to which they are
then taken to refer.  Later speakers are able to use the term to refer to the kind identified at the
introduction of the term by way of a causal chain that links their use of the term to the introductory
event.  If reference is independent of description, and is established at initial term introductions, then
it is insensitive to variation in descriptive content.  Thus, even if the descriptions that theories
provide of the entities in their domain undergo significant change, it may be denied that
discontinuity of reference is the inevitable accompaniment of theory change.
But, despite the initial promise of the causal theory, the situation is not as clear-cut as the
above suggests.  The causal theory of reference does not admit of straightforward application to the
problem of reference change in science.  For one thing, there appear to be genuine cases of reference
change in the history of science (e.g. ‘atom’, ‘electron’, ‘gene’).  As a result, post-introductory use
of terms must be granted a role in reference determination.  Otherwise, it is unclear how to reconcile
the causal theory with the facts about reference change.  For another thing, ostensive introduction
of terms for observable natural kinds is problematic.  Individual members of natural kinds belong
to a variety of different kinds (e.g. species, genus, animate object).  Unless the relevant kind is
specified by means of description, ostensive term-introduction is subject to an indeterminacy of
reference.  Ostension alone is unable to distinguish between the multiple kinds instantiated by the
sample-set.  Related issues arise for theoretical terms.  The entities postulated by theories may fail
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to exist.  Likewise, the terms introduced to refer to such entities may fail to refer.  To allow for such
reference failure, descriptive content must play a role in the reference of theoretical terms.  This may
involve the specification of kind-constitutive properties or perhaps a description of the causal role
played by theoretical entities in producing phenomena.  In light of such points as these, the causal
theory of reference must be modified to allow for post-introductory change of reference, as well as
to allow descriptive apparatus to play a role in the determination of reference for observational and
theoretical terms.  The modified theory which results is a version of what has come to be known as
the causal-descriptive theory of reference.
Such an account removes the threat of widespread discontinuity of reference while allowing
for limited change of reference to occur in theory change.  If reference is not fully determined by
description, it may remain stable despite variation in the descriptive content associated with terms.
Some shift of reference may take place as a result of change in use following initial term
introduction, as well as due to changes which alter the descriptive apparatus required to remove
indeterminacy of ostension or to functionally specify theoretical entities.  But, given the role of
pragmatic factors in reference determination, there is sufficient continuity of reference between
theories to ensure the comparability of content.  For if theories are genuinely applied to the same
domain, there will always be at least some overlap in the reference of the terms employed by
theories in relation to the common domain.
We are now in a position to propose a response to the objection from rivalry.  Earlier, we saw
that the issue of how incommensurable theories may enter a relation of rivalry may be partially
resolved by the localized nature of semantic variance as well as the ability of scientists to understand
untranslatable theories.  But the ultimate resolution of this issue rests on the possibility of shared or
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overlapping reference.  If the terms of alternative theories are able to refer to at least some of the
same things, then it will be possible for them to enter into a relation of rivalry.  Semantically
incommensurable theories properly constitute rivals between which a choice must be made only if
they may be expressed using terms which enter into one or another relation of referential overlap.
Given the modified causal account of reference sketched above, we may be confident that theories
applied to the same domain do refer to the same things, so that they are able to enter into a relation
of rivalry.  At the same time, however, the problem of the incomparability of the content of
incommensurable theories has also been resolved.  For, on the basis of such overlap of reference,
it is entirely possible to compare claims that one theory makes about the world with those that a
semantically variant alternative makes about the world.  In light of such considerations about
reference and content comparison, it seems to me that the thesis of semantic incommensurability has
collapsed.  Indeed, use of the term ‘incommensurable’ to describe the relationship between
semantically variant theories has now become otiose.
3. Methodological incommensurability
While the semantic form of incommensurability is the primary form of incommensurability, it is
important to consider methodological incommensurability as well.  The idea that competing
paradigms are incommensurable due to variation in standards of scientific theory appraisal is found
in Kuhn’s original discussion in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, where it is conjoined with
semantic and perceptual difference between paradigms (e.g. pp. 103-110, 148).  In later work, Kuhn
restricted the notion of incommensurability to the semantic sphere.  However, the immense
popularity and influence of the book ensures that the notion continues to be associated in some
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quarters with methodological differences between paradigms.  The situation is different with
Feyerabend, whose views about the limitations of method resonate significantly with some aspects
of Kuhn’s treatment of method.  However, Feyerabend restricted his use of the notion of
incommensurability to the absence of logical relations between theories which he took to follow
from meaning variance.  For this reason, I will not explicitly discuss Feyerabend’s ‘epistemological
anarchist’ critique of scientific method here.  (Feyerabend explicitly distinguishes his view of
incommensurability from Kuhn’s in his (1978, p. 68).  See Nola and Sankey 2007, ch. 11 for
Feyerabend’s view of method.)
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn endorsed two views which suggest that there
may be no objective epistemic basis for the choice that scientists make between competing
paradigms in the context of a revolution.  On the one hand, Kuhn argued that the perceptual
experience of scientists is deeply influenced by the paradigm within which they work.  As a result,
observation is unable to play a neutral role in the choice between paradigms.  On the other hand,
Kuhn also argued that the standards employed by scientists in the appraisal of theories or paradigms
are themselves dependent upon the paradigm that they adopt.  He combined this with a denial that
there are any paradigm-independent standards.  At one point, he even commented that “As in
political revolutions, so in paradigm choice – there is no standard higher than the assent of the
relevant community” (1996, p. 94).
Kuhn’s idea that scientific theories or paradigms may be incommensurable due to variation
in methodological standards creates the impression of a relativistic view of the rationality of science.
For if observation is unable to function in a neutral manner and there are no shared standards of
theory appraisal, then there may be no objective ground on which to base the choice between
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competing theories or paradigms.  The only way that a scientist may justify adoption of a paradigm
would be by appeal to standards that are internal to the paradigm, as well as to observations that are
interpreted in light of the paradigm.  But this entails that there may be no objective basis for the
adoption of the paradigm itself.  For if no grounds independent of paradigm exist, then there may
be no objective basis on which to adopt the paradigm as opposed to a competitor.
The impression of a relativistic conception of scientific rationality is reinforced by Kuhn’s
remark that “there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community”.  This suggests
that there is no objective epistemically rational basis for theory choice.  At most, such choice is
grounded in social consensus that is not subject to objective epistemic constraint.  This apparent
implication of Kuhn’s views about theory choice has been the subject of sustained criticism by
philosophers who have sought to defend the epistemic rationality of science against the onslaught
of relativism.  By contrast, it has been welcomed by advocates of the sociology of science who
embrace a relativistic conception of scientific knowledge.  Indeed, sociologists who seek to
understand scientific change in terms of the play of political and social forces derive considerable
inspiration from this aspect of Kuhn’s views.
Yet throughout much of his later work Kuhn sought to distance himself from the relativistic
implications of his original account of theory change.  In a postscript to later editions of The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and especially in his paper ‘Objectivity, Value Judgment and
Theory Choice’ (1977), Kuhn maintained a less extreme position.  He did not wish to deny the
rationality of science.  His point, instead, is that the standards of scientific theory appraisal fail to
provide a “neutral algorithm of theory-choice”, which mechanically determines choice of theory
(1996, p. 200).  Nor did he wish to deny that there are universal standards.  There is a set of
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standards (e.g. accuracy, consistency, breadth, simplicity) which is largely stable, though they may
not always have been employed in a uniform manner throughout the history of science.  Rather than
dictate theory choice, the standards serve as a guide to such choice.  For this reason, Kuhn describes
the standards as values rather than rules; they “function not as rules, which determine choice, but
as values, which influence it” (1977, p. 331).
Kuhn’s revision betokens a moderate stance on which theory choice is informed by epistemic
values which provide a rational basis for such choice.  But while the revised position may evoke
fewer philosophical qualms about objectivity, it leaves scope for a limited form of
incommensurability that may arise within the system of standards.  This is due to lack of precision
and potential conflict between the standards which Kuhn sees as guiding theory choice.  In the first
place, Kuhn argues that the same standard of theory appraisal may be applied or interpreted in
different ways in the context of different theories.  For example, simplicity might be interpreted as
ease of use in one theory, but as absence of complexity in another.  Or competing theories might be
accurate in different areas of application.  In the second place, Kuhn holds that competing theories
may differentially satisfy the system of values.  For example, one theory might be more accurate but
less simple than another.  Or the simpler of two theories might not cohere as well as a competitor
with established theories.
In sum, scientists who employ the same standards may disagree in choice of paradigm.  They
may disagree about how shared standards are to be applied or understood, as well as the relative
weighting to be assigned to such standards.  As a result, Kuhn’s admission of shared standards does
not remove the threat of incommensurability.  For scientists who adopt opposing paradigms may
defend their choice by appeal to common standards, but understand the standards differently and
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attach a different relative importance to them.  In the absence of “higher” standards to adjudicate
between such conflicting valuations, it is unclear how such a stand-off may be resolved.
Despite this, Kuhn’s revised position is less objectionable than the original.  Indeed, I wish
to suggest that the revised position contains the seeds of a promising conception of scientific
rationality.  The key is Kuhn’s idea that scientific rationality is not governed by an algorithm of
theory choice.  There is no binding set of rules that leads to a single, determinate outcome in every
case of theory choice.  As has been argued by H.I. Brown in his book Rationality (1988), a
significant role is played in rational decision-making by a capacity to form judgement that is not
governed by rules.  Such judgement is employed to interpret and apply standards of theory appraisal,
as well as to assign relative importance to such standards. Judgement is exemplified in the way that
the standards are understood and put into practice.  Because there may be alternative ways to
understand, apply and rank the standards, the exercise of judgement may not always lead to the same
decision for all scientists.  In the context of theory choice, scientists may arrive at opposing
decisions on a rational basis.  Because of the role played by judgement, and the imprecision and lack
of order of the operative standards, scientists may have rational grounds for disagreement.  As a
result, we must allow that there may be rational disagreement in science, rather than assume that
rationality entails agreement.
No doubt, some philosophers will resist such talk of rational disagreement.  They may detect
a hint of relativism in the idea that scientists may disagree on the basis of shared standards.  For if
scientists rationally disagree despite sharing standards, this may suggest that there are no objective
standards of rationality after all.  For, surely, it might be argued, if there are objective standards, then
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there is no room for scientists to disagree.  The whole idea of objectivity is that shared standards
provide a neutral basis on which to decide between conflicting beliefs.
But this idea of objectivity may be usefully contested on the basis of Kuhn’s denial of an
algorithm of theory choice.  There are two main reasons why the position I ascribe to the later Kuhn
need not be construed as relativist.  In the first place, rational belief admits of greater flexibility than
does true belief.  On a non-relativist conception of truth, it is not possible for both members of a pair
of contradictory propositions to be true.  But it may be possible for both members of a pair of
contradictory propositions to be justifiably believed.  Different epistemic agents may diverge in their
assessment of the evidence.  They may appeal to different – or differently interpreted – standards
in justifying their opposing attitudes toward the same proposition.  Given the sensitivity of rational
belief to evidence, as well as the possibility of legitimate alternative standards, it is possible for
believers to be justified in accepting contradictory propositions as true.  The flexible nature of
justification compared to truth is what permits such difference of opinion to obtain without falling
into a position of epistemic relativism.
In the second place, it is a mistake to suppose that a non-algorithmic account of the kind
suggested by Kuhn must give rise to an unduly permissive account of rationality.  The account does
not allow that any belief whatsoever may be justified.  For it imposes constraints on justified belief.
The account lays down a set of shared standards of theory appraisal, rather than postulating the
existence of distinct sets of radically alternative epistemic norms.  The shared standards provide the
basis for criteria of scientific acceptability which may be used to demarcate science from non-
science.  Beliefs or theories that fail to satisfy any or most of the standards of theory appraisal are
to be rejected as unscientific.  Rational disagreement in science is restricted to disagreement about
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theories which minimally satisfy the set of operative epistemic standards.  Satisfaction of shared
standards serves as the threshold for admission into the set of scientifically viable options.  Rational
disagreement is possible between scientists who favour one of the scientifically viable alternatives
over another.  A scientist who endorsed a theory that failed to satisfy any of the standards would
thereby fail to satisfy minimal conditions of scientific rationality.  An account that is able to screen
out inadequate theories which fail to minimally satisfy shared standards of scientific rationality,
though allowing for divergence of opinion with respect to theories which surpass the threshold, is
not a relativistic conception of rationality.  For it requires that such theories satisfy shared standards
of epistemic justification in order to be adopted on a rational basis.
The one outstanding question that remains about this account of scientific rationality relates
to the epistemic foundation of the shared standards of theory appraisal.  Why is it epistemically
justified to adopt these standards as the basis of scientific theory choice?  This is a question to which
Kuhn did not provide a settled answer.  As we have seen, in his original account, he suggested the
ultimate justification of epistemic standards may rest on consensus within the scientific community.
He later flirted with an inductivist approach according to which the fact that previous scientific
practice led to scientific advance justifies the continuation of such practice (Kuhn 2000, p. 130).
But he came to favour an approach on which epistemic justification rests on semantic considerations
about the meaning of the word ‘science’ (e.g., Kuhn 2000, 214-215).
It is difficult to see how reflection on the meaning of the term ‘science’ can provide the
normative basis for standards of theory appraisal (for discussion, see Nola and Sankey 2007, pp.
293-297).  A more promising approach lies in the inductivist approach which Kuhn at one point
mentioned almost in passing.  Such an approach has much in common with a naturalistic approach
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to epistemic justification that has considerable following in epistemology and the philosophy of
science.  This approach treats standards of theory appraisal as tools of inquiry which are subject to
empirical evaluation.
A salient example of this approach is the normative naturalist meta-methodology proposed
by Larry Laudan in Beyond Positivism and Relativism.  According to this approach, proposed
standards or norms of scientific method may be put to empirical test by determining whether there
is evidence to show that the use of such standards leads to specified goals.  Laudan treats standards
or norms in instrumental fashion as means for the realization of epistemic ends.  On such an account,
it is a matter of empirical fact whether or not a particular methodological standard is indeed a
reliable means of advancing the epistemic goals of science.  Those standards which are reliable in
advancing such goals are bearers of epistemic warrant which may be employed to justify the
acceptance of a scientific belief or theory.  Those standards which fail to reliably conduce to such
ends do not carry epistemic warrant, so are unable to provide scientists with justification for their
beliefs.  Such an empirical approach to the appraisal of standards provides an objective basis on
which standards may be compared.  Some standards may be shown on the basis of empirical
evidence to be capable of providing epistemic warrant.  Others may be shown on the basis of such
evidence to be incapable of providing such warrant.  Such an approach provides an objective
response to the question of the epistemic grounds for standards of theory appraisal.
The normative naturalist account of epistemic warrant provides a way to place Kuhn’s shared
standards in an anti-relativistic framework.  But it is not an uncontroversial position.  Some object
to the naturalist project, arguing, for example, that normative naturalism itself must rest on an a
priori principle of induction in order to supply the warrant for methodological standards.  Others
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attempt to reconcile Kuhn’s views with Bayesian confirmation theory by taking Kuhn’s values as
a guide for assigning prior probabilities to hypotheses, which may be fed into an algorithm in the
form of Bayes’ theorem.  Nevertheless, I suggest that the combination of a naturalistic account of
warrant with a judgement-based model of rationality provides a promising way to accommodate
Kuhn’s later ideas about shared standards within a non-relativistic approach that allows for rational
divergence of opinion.  There may be other ways  to derive insight from Kuhn’s work without
landing up in a position of epistemic relativism.  But the position I have outlined seems to usefully
combine Kuhn’s idea that scientific rationality is non-algorithmic with the anti-relativist idea that
methodological standards require objective epistemic warrant.
4. Prospects for incommensurability
In my treatment of the issue of incommensurability I have employed a distinction between semantic
and methodological forms of incommensurability.  In his original discussion of the topic in The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn presented both forms of incommensurability as aspects of
a single more general form of incommensurability.  I choose to treat the semantic and
methodological forms of incommensurability separately for two main reasons.  First, Kuhn came
to recognize that the issues are distinct, as is evident from the fact that he treated them as separate
matters in later work.  Moreover, Feyerabend explicitly distinguished his understanding of
incommensurability from Kuhn’s precisely in virtue of his own more restricted semantic form of the
doctrine.  Second, the considerations about meaning, reference and translation that arise in relation
to the former are distinct from the considerations about method, rationality and warrant that arise
with regard to the second.  While it might be the case that methodological and conceptual change
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occur together in the same historical episode, there is no sense in which they constitute the same
phenomena.  The only reason why they might be dealt with conjointly is that their co-occurrence
may increase obstacles to scientific communication and rational decision-making in the context of
revolutionary theory change.
It may now be asked what to make of the prospects of the thesis of incommensurability.  Is
there anything further to be said on its behalf?  In my estimation, little of substance remains to be
said about either aspect of the topic.  The claim that scientific theories are incommensurable for
semantic reasons seems unsustainable in light of the considerations in the theory of reference that
have been canvassed here.  The claim that scientific theories are incommensurable in a
methodological sense seems equally untenable in light of Kuhn’s admission of the existence of
shared standards of theory appraisal, though an innocuous form of incommensurability may arise
within those standards.  Future work in the theory of reference or in the theory of method may lead
to an increasingly refined account of semantic and methodological change.  It will not lead to a
fundamental change of outlook in relation to the topic of incommensurability.
This is not to say that there is nothing of substance in the claims that Feyerabend and Kuhn
made on behalf of incommensurability.  It seems clear that scientific theory change is characterized
by conceptual and semantic change of the kinds highlighted by Feyerabend and Kuhn, though the
consequences of such change are not as dramatic as at first appeared on the basis of their early
writings about the topic.  A similar remark applies in the case of methodological
incommensurability.  Kuhn’s discussion of standards of theory appraisal, as well as Feyerabend’s
writing on the changes and limitations of method – which he treats as separate from the topic of
incommensurability – have drawn attention to variations of a methodological nature that have
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occurred in the history of science.  But, especially in light of Kuhn’s admission of shared standards
of theory appraisal, the consequences of such methodological change for the rationality of scientific
theory change are, again, far less dramatic than at first appeared to be the case.
For these reasons, I do not anticipate that a sustained philosophical discussion of the topic
of incommensurability will continue into the future.  It is an idea whose time has passed.  It does
little substantive work in the philosophy of science.  The notion of incommensurability has broken
down under analysis, leaving little but the idea that conceptual and methodological change occur
as part of the development of science.  There is little sense that such change throws either the
rationality or the objectivity of science into question.
Of course, my view of the future prospects for the thesis of incommensurability may not be
shared by all parties to the discussion.  To cite just one example, the influential Kuhn scholar, Paul
Hoyningen-Huene, appears to hold that the incommensurability thesis may be sustained within the
context of a neo-Kantian interpretation of Kuhn’s metaphysics.  Moreover, Hoyningen-Huene and
his co-workers, Hanne Andersen and Eric Oberheim, have even argued that there is a relationship
of meta-incommensurability that obtains between conflicting views in the philosophy of science.
They argue, in particular, that my own earlier discussion of the topic in The Incommensurability
Thesis falls prey to such meta-incommensurability by uncritically presupposing a realist stance in
its treatment of semantic incommensurability (Hoyningen-Huene et al 1996).
As for the question of relativism, and the consequences for relativism of incommensurability,
it seems clear that no extreme relativistic consequences may be sustained on the basis of the claim
of incommensurability.  The content of semantically variant theories may be compared by means
of overlapping reference, and there are at least some shared standards of theory appraisal applicable
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to competing theories.  Hence, common semantic and epistemic ground exists on the basis of which
an objective rational choice may be made between competing theories.  As indicated in my opening
remarks, the translation failure associated with semantic incommensurability might be employed as
the basis for a constrained form of relativism about truth.  A true sentence that is asserted by one
theory may be untranslatable into the vocabulary of a semantically variant theory.  But while this
suggests that the capacity to express a truth depends on the semantic resources of a language, it
provides no support for the classic relativist view that the truth-value of a proposition depends on
context.
This leaves the possibility of an ontological form of relativism that might be based on the
thesis of semantic incommensurability.  Kuhn’s talk of the world changing with change of paradigm
may be taken to suggest the idealist thesis that reality is itself dependent upon belief system, theory
or conceptual scheme.  But Kuhn’s talk of world change should be interpreted as at most a
metaphorical expression of the idea that in scientific revolution there is a profound change in the
way that scientists take the world to be.  It is not the world itself that changes.  Rather, it is the
purported referents of theoretical terms that are no longer taken to be the same thing as in previous
theory.  To think that the world changes, even in the weaker sense of a Kantian phenomenal world,
does such violence to common sense that it may be dismissed out of hand.  As we reflect upon
philosophical matters, we must not lose touch with the world around us that is given in our everyday
experience.  Common sense may be the starting-point in philosophy.  But it is not to be abandoned
as inquiry proceeds.
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